Abstract. Heinrich Behmann (1891-1970) obtained his Habilitation under David Hilbert in Göttingen in 1921 with a thesis on the decision problem. In his thesis, he solved-independently of Löwenheim and Skolem's earlier work-the decision problem for monadic second-order logic in a framework that combined elements of the algebra of logic and the newer axiomatic approach to logic then being developed in Göttingen. In a talk given in 1921, he outlined this solution, but also presented important programmatic remarks on the significance of the decision problem and of decision procedures more generally. The text of this talk as well as a partial English translation are included. §1. Behmann's Career. Heinrich Behmann was born January 10, 1891, in Bremen. In 1909 he enrolled at the University of Tübingen. There he studied mathematics and physics for two semesters and then moved to Leipzig, where he continued his studies for three semesters. In 1911 he moved to Göttingen, at that time the most important center of mathematical activity in Germany. He volunteered for military duty in World War I, was severely wounded in 1915, and returned to Göttingen in 1916 . In 1918 , he obtained his doctorate with a thesis titled The Antinomy of Transfinite Numbers and its Resolution by the Theory of Russell and Whitehead [Die Antinomie der transfiniten Zahl und ihre Auflösung durch die Theorie von Russell und Whitehead ] under the supervision of David Hilbert [Behmann 1918 ]. The thesis is devoted to a reconstruction of the theory of Principia Mathematica motivated by a desire for removing a number of unclarities as well as by an attempt to put the project of Principia squarely in an empiricist framework. Recent scholarship [Mancosu 1999 [Mancosu , 2003 ] has brought to light Behmann's pivotal role in the understanding and appreciation of Principia in Göttingen, thereby providing some essential pieces connecting Russell's and Whitehead's project with the development of logic and the foundations of mathematics in Hilbert's school. Behmann then started to work on the decision problem the fact that it is a problem of fundamental importance on its own account, and, unlike the applications of earlier Algebra of Logic, not at all imagined for the purpose of symbolic treatment, whereas, on the other hand, the only means of any account for its solution are exactly those of symbolic logic. (Behmann to Russell, August 8, 1922. Russell Archive, McMaster University)
§1. Behmann's Career. Heinrich Behmann was born January 10, 1891, in Bremen. In 1909 he enrolled at the University of Tübingen. There he studied mathematics and physics for two semesters and then moved to Leipzig, where he continued his studies for three semesters. In 1911 he moved to Göttingen, at that time the most important center of mathematical activity in Germany. He volunteered for military duty in World War I, was severely wounded in 1915, and returned to Göttingen in 1916 . In 1918 , he obtained his doctorate with a thesis titled The Antinomy of Transfinite Numbers and its Resolution by the Theory of Russell and Whitehead [Die Antinomie der transfiniten Zahl und ihre Auflösung durch die Theorie von Russell und Whitehead ] under the supervision of David Hilbert [Behmann 1918 ]. The thesis is devoted to a reconstruction of the theory of Principia Mathematica motivated by a desire for removing a number of unclarities as well as by an attempt to put the project of Principia squarely in an empiricist framework. Recent scholarship [Mancosu 1999 [Mancosu , 2003 ] has brought to light Behmann's pivotal role in the understanding and appreciation of Principia in Göttingen, thereby providing some essential pieces connecting Russell's and Whitehead's project with the development of logic and the foundations of mathematics in Hilbert's school. Behmann then started to work on the decision problem in logic, for which he coined the term "Entscheidungsproblem". In 1921 Behmann obtained his Habilitation with a thesis titled Contributions to the Algebra of Logic, in particular to the Decision Problem [Beiträge zur Algebra der Logik, insbesondere zum Entscheidungsproblem]. On May 10, 1921, Behmann reported his results to the Göttingen Mathematical Society [Behmann 1921] ; the text of this lecture is reproduced below. The results were subsequently published in an article in Mathematische Annalen [Behmann 1922] . With the Habilitation he was conferred the venia legendi, which allowed him to work and teach as Privatdozent in the Department of Mathematics in Göttingen from 1921 to 1925 . In 1925 he became professor at the University of Halle.
Behmann was not only in close contact with his colleagues in Göttin-gen (most prominently Hilbert and Bernays, but also with Wilhelm Ackermann and Moses Schönfinkel) but during the 1920s he also actively collaborated with a number of people interested in scientific philosophy such as Carnap and Felix Kaufmann. A visit to Vienna in 1930 gave rise to an interesting attempt (alas, failed) to show that classical mathematics is for the most part intuitionistically justifiable (for the analysis of the full episode, which also involved Gödel and Wittgenstein, see Mancosu [2002] , [2003] ). Behmann is also known for an interesting solution to the paradoxes of set theory that has been revived and discussed in the literature on truth (see Parsons [2003] and Thiel [2002] for the historical context). On account of his affiliation with the NSDAP he was dismissed from his position in Halle in 1945. Fearing deportation, he fled Soviet-occupied Saxony to his home town Bremen in 1946. Due in part to his wartime injury, he was unable to obtain academic employment. He died in Bremen on February 3, 1970. Behmann's extensive Nachlaß was for many years in Aachen and later Erlangen, and is now housed at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin. See Haas and Stemmler [1981] for additional detail on Behmann's life and work and an overview of Behmann's papers. §2. The Decision Problem: from the Algebra of Logic to Principia. The reference to the "decision problem" in the title of Behmann's lecture may well be the first time the expression made its public appearance. Behmann claimed to have coined the word on several occasions. For instance, he wrote to Russell in 1922: It was what I call the Problem of Decision, formulated in the said paragraph [ ¶1 of Behmann [1922] ] that induced me to study the logical work of Schröder. And I soon recognized that, in order to solve my particular problem, it was necessary first to settle the main problem of Schröder's Calculus of Regions, his so-called Problem of Elimination. [. . . ] Indeed, the chief merit of the said problem [the Decision Problem] is, I daresay, due to the fact that it is a problem of fundamental importance on its own account, and, unlike the applications of earlier Algebra of Logic, not at all imagined for the purpose of symbolic treatment, whereas, on the other hand, the only means of any account for its solution are exactly those of symbolic logic. (Behmann to Russell, August 8, 1922. Russell Archive, McMaster University) In a letter to Scholz (December 27, 1927, Behmann Archive, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin), Behmann claims to have been the first to "explicitly" [ausdrücklich] pose the general decision problem. The general decision problem is the extension of the decision problem from propositional logic to full logic. In the same letter, he grants that related problems had emerged in the algebra of logic tradition but that the full problem had not been stated before him. He also stresses that one should not confuse this "Entscheidungsproblem" with the "Entscheidungsproblem" formulated, in connection to Grelling's paradox, by Hessenberg [1906] . Behmann also points to the connection between the decision problem and the "elimination problem" central to the algebra of logic. He says that the elimination problem must be considered to be independent of the general decision problem while it is at the same time a special case of it. Behmann mentions Peirce, Schröder, and Löwenheim as among the most important contributors to work on the elimination problem. (Here it is important to point out that Behmann achieved his important results on the decidability of the monadic second-order predicate calculus independently of Löwenheim, whose work he discovered after he had found the result.) In the same letter to Scholz, Behmann mentioned that the he had learned the solution of the decision problem for propositional logic using normal forms directly from Hilbert. 1 Moving now to the lecture, let us begin by pointing out that in his [1922] , Behmann made explicit what in his lecture he only presupposes, namely that "As specifically Peano and Russell have seen, every mathematical proposition can fundamentally be thought of as a purely logical state of affairs." 2 Since, thanks in particular to the work of Whitehead and Russell, all of logic can be axiomatized, it follows from the expressibility of every mathematical statement as a logical one that every mathematical question could be decided if it were possible to decide for every logical sentence whether it could be derived from the axioms.
1 Already Hilbert [1905] considered conjunctive and disjunctive normal forms and decidability of propositional logic. The first explicit discussion of the decision problem for propositional logic was given in Bernays [1918] , but the essential idea is found in Hilbert [1917/18] ; see Zach [1999] for discussion).
2 "Wie namentlich Peano und Russell erkannt haben, läßt sich in der Tat jeder mathematische Satz letzlich als ein rein logischer Sachverhalt auffassen" (Behmann [1922] , p. 166, note 1).
And this leads to the claim, made in Behmann's lecture in 1921 and in Behmann [1922, p. 166] , that a solution of this problem would transform mathematics into "one enormous triviality." 3 To repeat, while the connection is left implicit in the 1921 lecture, it is also obviously presupposed in the way the lecture moves from a reflection on mathematics to the full decision problem. In the lecture, Behmann continues by asserting that the fact that logic (and hence mathematics) can be axiomatized is not enough to turn mathematics into a triviality, for the rules of derivation tell us "only what one may do, and not what one should do." Behmann then describes the decision problem as the more specific problem of finding a deterministic, computational procedure to decide any mathematical claim:
[We require] not only the individual operations but also the path of calculation as a whole should be specified by rules, in other words, an elimination of thinking in favor of mechanical calculation. If a logical or mathematical assertion is given, the required procedure should give complete instructions for determining whether the assertion is correct or false by a deterministic [zwangsläufig] calculation after finitely many steps. The problem thus formulated I want to call the general decision problem. While Behmann's programmatic remarks are noteworthy for their analysis of the significance of the decision problem, and for his emphasis on deterministic computation, neither they nor the methods for solving the decision problems developed by him yet amount to a coherent analysis of the notion of deterministic computational procedure.
In order to make headway on the decision problem for logic, Behmann suggests that the axiomatic approach is unsuitable, and that one instead has to adopt the perspective of the algebra of logic. As mentioned above, Behmann saw the decision problem as connected to the elimination problem in the algebra of logic tradition, and so he found it necessary to work through it. We cannot here give a full explanation of the elimination problem in the algebra of logic, which is itself only a sub-problem of what is usually called the "solution problem" [Auflösungsproblem in Schröder]. The latter problem was already stated by Boole. Basically, the idea is that from a set of logical equations (usually containing unknowns) one would 3 Bernays [1918] also suggested that the decision procedure for propositional logic reduces it to triviality. The idea that a decision procedure for all of logic would trivialize mathematics led von Neumann [1927] , on the other hand, to doubt that such a procedure can be found (cf. [Gandy 1995] , §5.2). Weyl [1927] similarly writes, "Completeness in this sense would only be ensured by the establishment of such procedural rules of proof as would lead demonstrably to a solution for every pertinent problem. Mathematics would thereby be trivialized. But such a philosopher's stone has not been discovered and never will be discovered" (p. 20; p. 24 of the translation). Behmann also compares a decision method to the "philosopher's stone" in the lecture.
like to find (some or all) "solutions" for such equations, namely values of the variables that make the equations true. In the hands of Schröder, this process leads to the study of the "resultants" r P (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 of an equation which eliminates a variable y from an equivalent polynomial inequality of the form P (x 1 , . . . , x n , y) = 0. The "elimination" problem is the determination of such "resultants" (for a detailed analysis and further references see Bondoni [2007] , [2009] ). Rather than attempting a presentation of the context of the two problems within the algebra of logic tradition, let us mention how they emerge within the second-order predicate calculus with binary predicates (the restriction to unary predicates or the generalization to n-ary (n > 2) predicates is immediate). In the decision problem one only investigates the validity, or lack thereof, of any well-formed formula A of the calculus. In the elimination problem, one also asks for a well-formed formula B that is logically equivalent to A but simpler (thereby simplifying the determination of its validity or lack thereof). For instance, given the formula
we might want a first-order formula equivalent to it. It is not too hard to check that
is one such formula. This is the "resultant" of the elimination problem (see Ackermann [1934] ). According to Ackermann, the decision problem is actually a special case of the elimination problem. Behmann's result provides a solution to the elimination problem for formulas containing monadic predicate variables and this immediately yields the solution to the decision problem for the same class of formulas. Neither the elimination nor the decision problem for variable binary predicates admits of a general solution. We now describe Behmann's result. §3. Behmann's Result. Behmann's result was first announced in his May 1921 lecture and published the next year in Mathematische Annalen [Behmann 1922] . Behmann also reported it in September 1923 at the annual meeting of the German Mathematical Society in Marburg [Behmann 1923] . The result gives a method for deciding, given a formula of monadic second-order logic, whether it is valid [allgemeingültig] . Behmann considers three classes of formulas: domain A is the class of firstorder formulas with monadic predicate symbols (but without identity), domain B is the class of second-order formulas with monadic predicate variables (but without identity), and B * is B plus the identity predicate. Behmann's aim is to solve the elimination problem for B * , i.e., to show that any monadic second-order formula is equivalent to a first-order formula. Behmann did not have a precise semantics for his languages available, so the solution to the decision problem, for him, involved finding a procedure to determine whether a given formula was true under its intuitive interpretation for every possible domain. Since formulas with predicate constants do not express determinate propositions independently of an interpretation of the predicate symbols, Behmann's notion of validity properly applies only to second-order sentences containing no predicate constants. For instance, Behmann considers the decision problem to apply not to formulas like ∀y(Ay ∨ ¬Ay), but only to sentences such as ∀X∀y(Xy ∨ ¬Xy). Solving the elimination problem for such sentences, then, would show that they are each equivalent to a first-order sentence involving no extralogical symbols, only identity, and hence expresses a condition on the size of the domain. The sentence is valid if and only if the condition is compatible with any size of the domain whatsoever.
In keeping with the tradition of using normal forms in the investigation of questions like the decision problem, Behmann considers which special forms formulas can be brought into. If all predicate symbols are monadic, then every formula is equivalent to a formula which is a propositional combination of formulas of the form ∀x(A 1 x ∨ · · · ∨ A n x) and ∃x(A 1 x ∧ · · · ∧ A n x), where A i x is atomic or the negation of an atomic formula.
Second-order quantifiers ∀X and ∃X distribute over ∧ and ∨, respectively, just like first-order quantifiers do. Behmann is thus able to reduce the problem to that of removing the second-order quantifier from a formula of the form ∃X φ where φ is a conjunction of formulas of the forms ∀y(F y ∨ Xy), ∀y(F y ∨ ¬Xy), ∃y(F y ∧ Xy), and ∃y(F y ∧ ¬Xy). Each of these formulas can be translated into Behmann's own version of class notation (this notation expresses certain relationships between the classes denoted by F and X, e.g., ∃y(F y ∧ Xy) expresses that F ∩ X = ∅). Behmann's notation is more flexible than the class-calculus notation of Schröder, who had been unable to solve the elimination problem even for the monadic case. However, the first-order equivalents obtained by Behmann for formulas in "main elimination form" in general will contain identity. In the last part of his paper, then, Behmann generalizes the procedure to formulas of domain B * . His generalized class notation then contains as basic expressions formulas that state that the intersection of several classes contains at least n objects, and its dual, that the union of several classes contains all but n objects. The elimination problem is solved by showing that a second-order quantifier can be removed from a conjunction (in the case of ∃X) or disjunction (in the case of ∀X) of such expressions. If the original second-order formula contains no predicate or individual constants, the resulting formula is a propositional combination of statements of the form "there are at least n objects" and "there are at most n objects". §4. Further Developments. For anyone familiar with the standard textbook proof of the decidability of monadic logic, Behmann's proof seems terribly unwieldy-and surprisingly so, since the usual method is so simple. The usual method consists in showing that if the sentence has a countermodel, it has a finite countermodel of a size depending on the number of predicate symbols in the sentence (specifically, 2 k for k the number of predicate symbols). Since one can check all such potential countermodels, the question is decidable. This method of solving the decision problem for monadic sentences was first outlined by Hilbert and Bernays [1922/23] in a lecture course in the Winter semester of 1922/23. Parts of the relevant sections of the lecture notes were later incorporated almost verbatim into the textbook by Hilbert and Ackermann [1928] .
In the same semester, the Russian mathematician Moses Schönfinkel outlined a decidability proof for validity of sentences with a single binary predicate symbol in prenex form with the quantifier prefix ∃x∀y. The manuscript containing the proof remains unpublished, but Bernays published a paper containing the result, extended to sentences with an arbitrary number of binary predicate symbols, in 1927. The result was generalized a year later by Ackermann [1928] , who showed that validity of formulas with quantifier prefix ∃ * ∀∃ * is decidable. The paper by Bernays and Schönfinkel [1928] is notable, then, not for the proof of decidability of the special case of the Ackermann class, but for three other contributions. The first is the observation that instead of deciding validity of formulas, it is easier to focus on satisfiability-a concept that Bernays likely adopted from Skolem and Löwenheim. Note that no definition of model was available yet, and neither validity nor satisfiability were defined precisely. The second was the first proof in print of the decidability of satisfiability of monadic sentences by giving a bound on the size of models. The same approach is used in most subsequent papers on the decision problem. Indeed, already Ackermann's paper the following year established the result mentioned by proving that the class of prenex sentences of the form ∀ * ∃ * A is "finitely controllable." Bernays's third contribution-and the contribution for which the paper is mainly known-is the proof of the decidability of satisfiability of sentences in the so-called Bernays-Schönfinkel class (prenex sentences of the form ∃ * ∀ * A).
Hilbert mentioned the decision problem as one of the main open problems in the foundations of mathematics in his address to the 1928 International Congress of Mathematicians in Bologna [Hilbert 1928a [Hilbert , 1928b ; it is also mentioned prominently in the textbook by Hilbert and Ackermann [1928] . Subsequently, a number of other logicians not directly connected to Hilbert's group in Göttingen contributed partial solutions to the decision problem. These include Ramsey, Herbrand, Kálmar, and Gödel. A good presentation of the solvable cases of the decision problem up to the 1950s is given by Ackermann [1954] . More comprehensive treatments can be found in Dreben and Goldfarb [1979] and Börger, Grädel, and Gurevich [1997] .
The general case of the decision problem for logic was shown to be unsolvable in 1935-36, independently by Church [1936] and Turing [1937] . This result relied not only on the work of Gödel [1931] , but it required in particular mathematically precise and general definitions of computational procedures, in particular, decision procedures. Church's notion of lambda-definable functions and Turing machines provided some of the first such definitions. They were anticipated by related work carried out by Emil Post in the 1920s, who, however, never published it. 4 Behmann's contribution to the decision problem, like other algorithmic methods for solving mathematical problems, was in the first instance an example of such a computational decision procedure. The significance of Behmann's lecture lies mainly in the clear articulation of the very general nature of the problem to be decided-essentially, every mathematical questionand his incisive reflections in the programmatic part of his lecture on the nature of computational processes. underlining in Behmann's manuscript has been incorporated (as italics) only sparingly, and editorial emendations other than pagination has been omitted in the translation. The complete text in the original German follows below.
Decision problem and algebra of logic
May 10, 1921
A couplet, which goes something like this: Sunt mathematici veri natique poeta; sed, quae finxerant, hos probare decet. is due, as far as I know, to Kronecker. In translation:
We mathematicians are true poets with a calling; But we still must prove our poetry! And we will have to admit that there is something true in these words. The work of the mathematician can indeed be compared with that of the poet, or generally with that of a creative artist. They, too, need imagination, in order to obtain a sufficiently large range of possibilities and to focus on certain conceivable connections between facts or between thoughts for carrying out their investigations; they need trained sensitivity for identifying the correct one among a dizzying array of possibilities, and for making lucky guesses of so far unsuspected states of affairs; they need subtlety to present their results in their suitable form. As Boltzmann once said, "among all artists, the mathematician is closest to the demiurge."
At the same time, the mathematician is not just a creative artist, butand this tears us at once from our aesthetic speculation-they are subject to the additional requirement, | to which Kroneker points in his couplet, 2 that their creations-if we can call it that-must withstand the sharpest test of critical reason. They ought not just to assert theorems, even if they are beautiful and correct, but they must also prove them, and with it add them to the store of secured knowledge. No other science sets up this requirement with the same inexorable rigor, and anyone who understands the nature of mathematics will not attempt to haggle to weaken it, but instead to tighten it as much as possible.
There is now no doubt that in practice this very same requirement is an extremely significant burden for the mathematician. The reason for this is roughly the following:
While in the beginning mathematics-and this is not just true for mathematics as a whole but for every single one of its disciplines, regardless of how early or late they may have come to be developed-always first focuses on specific single problems and attempts to solve them with whatever methods it already has at its disposal, it nevertheless, in the course of its development, eventually develops general methods for wide classes of problems (even if these methods do not solve every problem of a certain kind). The problems to which these methods apply then do not require any inventive insight but only the calculatory tools provided. Once this is accomplished, the path to a solution no longer goes by searching and cutting a trail in every direction of the compass, but it is now completely given, | fully developed, and furnished with clear markers; now the path, 3 as I would like to put it, inevitably leads to the destination. The problem has thus turned into a mere exercise in computation.
Unfortunately the kind of progress I have just characterized is nowhere to be found when the problem is that of proving mathematical propositions. The attitude long left behind in the case of mathematical problems in general still applies in the case of proving mathematical theorems: it indeed requires a new, creative thinking for each case, a lucky insight which of course can never be forced even with the most enormous of efforts. The task of verifying the validity of a given mathematical claim at first presents itself as being of a very different nature than that of solving a cubic equation or of carrying out the Gaussian interpolation algorithm. For the latter we know that we can always find a solution as well as how to find it, for the former neither one nor the other. For the latter, we have fully developed, perspicuous and deterministic procedures, for the former the important aspect requires instinct, a serendipitous intuition. We are thus unfortunately still far from being able to delegate the work of proving mathematical theorems to mathematical laborers, in the way we are regarding numerical calculations.
At first glance the development of a general, deterministic procedure for proving mathematical propositions may seem like a hopeless, indeed ludicrous endeavor, | perhaps comparable to the medieval quest for the 4 philosopher's stone. And indeed the achievement of this goal would be no less significant than the wonders believed to be inherent in that mythical substance for not just mathematics but for knowledge as a whole. If we look more closely, the entirety of mathematics would indeed be transformed into one enormous triviality; we would be able to solve every problem posed to us-perhaps not in the intended sense, which may be impossible-, but at least in the sense in which it can be solved at all, as set out by Hilbert in his Paris address "Mathematical Problems."
From a purely mathematical perspective, however, there does indeed appear to be no possibility for attacking this problem in its enormous variety, say, by dividing mathematical propositions into classes according to their complexity and by advancing from the simple to the more difficult.
Nevertheless we have, or so I would like to claim, attained a level of knowledge in an area which is not directly mathematical, but indeed much more fundamental, that we not only have the ability but every right to formulate this problem explicitly and rigorously and to begin its investigation. Indeed we must descend to a lower level, since we are really no longer working on a properly mathematical problem, but a "supramathematical" problem. This lower level is symbolic logic, which has been anticipated by Leibniz, first taken on by Boole, | and developed extensively by Schröder,
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Frege, Peano, and Russell.
In fact, at its present state of development, it already provides us with the ability to formulate the problem in a relatively simple and transparent form, by allowing us to express all propositions in questions in a uniform way using just a few symbols. Specifically, we can express every logical or mathematical proposition with the following few words alone:
Of course this does not mean that in practice one always has to carry out the reduction this far; instead, one will introduce new signs, as far as is desirable for the particular application, for other concepts, such as and, there are, the class, the numbers, the operation, etc.
With this insight we already have made progress. We now only have to consider expressions formed according to rules from these symbols and thus have cast off the bonds of natural language.
As is well known, symbolic logic can be axiomatized, i.e., reduced to a system of relatively few basic formulas and rules, so that proving theorems now appears to be a mere computational procedure. One only has to write down new formulas to formulas already given, where the rules already specify what may be written down in every case. Proving then has taken on the nature of a game. It is similar to, | say, chess, where by moving 6 one's own pieces, perhaps while removing one of the opponent's pieces, one transforms a given position into a new one, where only the movement of one's own piece and the removal of the opponent's must be allowed by the rules of the game.
But this very comparison brings out quite starkly that the view of symbolic logic just detailed cannot suffice at all for our problem. For it shows us, like the rules of chess, only what one may do, and not what one should do. The latter remains-in the one as in the other case-a question of inventive thinking, of lucky combination. We, however, require a lot more: not only the individual operations but also the path of calculation as a whole should be specified by rules, in other words, an elimination of thinking in favor of mechanical calculation. If a logical or mathematical statement is given, the required procedure should give complete instructions for determining whether the statement is correct or false by a deterministic calculation after finitely many steps. The problem thus formulated I want to call the general decision problem.
It is essential to the character of this problem that as method of proof only entirely mechanical calculation according to given instructions, without any activity of thinking in the narrower sense, is allowed. One might, if one wanted to, speak of mechanical or machine-like thinking. (Perhaps one can one day even let it be carried out by a machine.) |
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It is thus not merely symbolic logic as such that is required, but a specific direction within symbolic logic, which not only investigates how one may compute, but how one should compute in order to attain a given goal. For a particular historical reason I would like to call this direction that of the algebra of logic, specifically because all important preparatory work in this area are subsumed under this name of algebra of logic (Boole, De Morgan, Peirce, Schröder). This subsumption is perhaps only accidental, since none of those just mentioned have seriously considered an application to the decision problem. But also in regards to its substance the name seems to me to be somewhat appropriate, since this narrower domain will have precisely the development of algorithms, i.e., deterministic procedures, such as those in algebra for finding solutions to equations, as its aim. I consider it a fortuitous coincidence that here we are afforded an opportunity to summarize these, in their superficial form relatively dubious and obscure-if not to say: boring and tedious-investigations under a new, unified and valuable perspective, and with it to save a large amount of deep and arduous intellectual labor from the inglorious fate of slowly mouldering away in libraries. For, as far as I can tell, general interest in the investigations of that older algebra of logic has almost completely ceased even among proponents of symbolic logic. | 8 I do not have to emphasize that despite all this we are today still extremely far away from a solution to the decision problem formulated above. At least I have succeeded in completely carrying through this problem for a certain modest domain of propositions, which nevertheless already contains quite a significant variety of propositions. It is this work, on which I would like to speak to you in particular.
Entscheidungsproblem und Algebra der Logik. The following manuscript by Heinrich Behmann, entitled "Entscheidungsproblem und Algebra der Logik," is the text to a lecture Behmann gave in the Göttin-gen Mathematical Society on May 10, 1921. The date and venue of the lecture are attested in the list of events at the Mathematische Gesellschaft in Göttingen in Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker Vereinigung 30 (1921) Schöpfung" -wenn wir so sagen dürfen -auch die schärfste Probe des kritischen Verstandes aushalten muß. Er soll nicht bloß Sätze aufstellen, und seien sie noch so schön und richtig, sondern er soll sie auch beweisen und damit erst dem bisherigen gesicherten Erkenntnisbesitz einfügen. In keiner anderen Wissenschaft wird diese Forderung mit der gleichen unerbittlichen Strenge gestellt, und wer das Wesen der Mathematik recht versteht, sucht von dieser Forderung nicht etwas abzuhandeln, sondern sie im Gegenteil so weit wie irgend tunlich noch zu verschärfen.
Es unterliegt nun aber keinem Zweifel, daß eben diese Forderung in der Praxis eine ganz [[außerordentliche] ] bedeutende Belastung für den Mathematiker bedeutet. Und zwar ist der Grund hierfür wesentlich der folgende:
Während anfänglich die Mathematik -und zwar gilt dies nicht nur für die Mathematik im ganzen, sondern für jedes einzelne ihrer Teilgebiete, so früh oder so spät dieses auch zur tatsächlichen Entwicklung gekommen sein mag -immer zunächst bestimmte einzelne Probleme ins Auge gefaßt und diese nun auf irgend eine Weise mit den ihr bereits zu Gebote stehenden Mitteln zu bewältigen sucht, gelangt sie dessenungeachtet im Verlaufe ihrer Entwicklung mehr und mehr dahin, wenn auch nicht für alle Probleme von einer irgendwie bestimmten Natur, so doch für ausgedehnte Klassen solcher Probleme allgemeine Verfahren zu entwickeln, sodaß es für die von diesen Verfahren beherrschten Probleme dann keines erfinderischen Scharfsinns, sondern nur noch der Beherrschung der vorausgesetzten rechnerischen Hilfsmittel bedarf. Damit ist der Weg zur Lösung nicht mehr ein nach irgend einer Himmelsrichtung zu suchender und neu zu bahnender, sondern er ist nunmehr ein fertig vorhandener, | voll 3 ausgebauter und mit deutlichen Wegweisern versehener, der, wie ich sagen möchte, zwangläufig auf das Ziel hinführt. Das Problem ist damit gewissermaßen zur bloßen Rechenaufgabe geworden.
Von einer Entwicklung, wie ich sie eben kennzeichnete, ist nun in dem Falle, daß es sich um das Beweisen mathematischer Aussagen handelt, leider nicht im entferntesten die Rede. Was bei den mathematischen Problemen im allgemeinen längstüberwundener Standpunkt ist: beim Beweisen mathematischer Sätze bedarf es in der Tat von Fall zu Fall des neuen erfinderischen Gedankens, einer glücklichen Eingebung, die sich bekanntlich auch durch die gewaltigste aufgewendete Mühe niemals erzwingen läßt. Die Aufgabe, eine gegebene mathematische Behauptung auf ihre Gültig-keit zu prüfen stellt sich ihrer Natur nach zunächst jedenfalls als eine ganz andere dar, als etwa diejenige, eine kubische Gleichung aufzulösen oder eine Gaußsche Ausgleichungsrechnung durchzuführen. Bei der zweiten wissen wir, daß wir die Lösung unbedingt finden können und wie wir sie finden können, bei der ersten weder das eine noch das andere. Bei der zweiten sind wir im Besitz vollständig ausgebauter,übersichtlicher und zwangläufiger Verfahren, bei der ersten bleibt das Wesentliche dem Gefühl, dem glücklichen Ahnungsvermögenüberlassen. Wir sind also leider noch weit davon entfernt, daß wir die Arbeit des Beweisens aufgestellter Sätze etwa einem mathematischen Hilfsarbeiterübertragen können, wie dies hinsichtlich der Durchführung einer numerischen Rechnung möglich ist.
Auf den ersten Blick mag freilich die Aufstellung eines allgemeinen, zwangläufigen Verfahrens für das Beweisen mathematischer Aussagen als ein hoffnungsloses, ja wahnwitziges Unterfangen erscheinen, | etwa ver-4 gleichbar dem mittelalterlichen Suchen nach dem Stein der Weisen. Und allerdings würde ja die Erreichung dieses Zieles an Bedeutung nicht nur für die Mathematik, sondern für unsere Erkenntnisüberhaupt den Wundern, die man sich von jenem sagenhaften Stein versprach, gewiß nichts nachgeben. Es wäre in der Tat, wenn wir genauer zusehen, die ganze Mathematik in eine ungeheure Trivialität verwandelt; wir würden jede uns gestellte Aufgabe -zwar nicht notwendig in dem gemeinten Sinne lösen, was ja unmöglich sein kann -, aber doch, wie Hilbert dies in seinem Pariser Vortrag [[über] ] "
Mathematische Probleme" ausgeführt hat, in dem Sinne erledigen, in welchem esüberhaupt einer Erledigung fähig ist.
Aber andererseits sieht man vom rein mathematischen Standpunkt in der Tat gar keine Möglichkeit, dieses Problems in seiner ungeheuren Vielgestaltigkeit irgendwie Herr zu werden, etwa die mathematischen Aussagen je nach dem Grade ihrer Verwicklung in Klassen einzuteilen und auf diese Weise vom Leichteren zum Schwierigeren fortzuschreiten.
Nichtsdestoweniger haben wir, wie ich behaupten möchte, heute bereits auf einem nicht unmittelbar mathematischen, sondern noch viel grundlegenderen Gebiete einen derartigen Erkenntnisstandpunkt erreicht, daß wir nicht nur die Möglichkeit, sondern auch ein gutes Recht haben, dieses Problem ausdrücklich und streng zu formulieren und in seine Untersuchung einzutreten. In der Tat müssen wir, da es sich hier im Grunde nicht mehr um ein eigentlich mathematisches, sondern gewissermaßen um ein "ü bermathematisches" Problem handelt, hier eine Stufe tiefer herabsteigen, und zwar zu der symbolischen Logik, wie sie von Leibniz vorausgeahnt, von Boole | in Angriff genommen und von Schröder, Frege, Peano und 5 Russell mächtig gefördert worden ist.
Tatsächlich gibt sie uns auf ihrem gegenwärtigen Entwicklungsstandpunkt bereits die Möglichkeit, das Problem auf eine verhältnismäßig einfache und durchsichtige Form zu bringen, indem sie uns eine einheitliche Darstellung aller in Betracht kommenden Aussagen durch ganz wenige Zeichen in die Hand gibt. Wir können nämlich [[grundsätzlich] ] jede logische oder mathematische Aussage grundsätzlich allein mit den folgenden wenigen Worten ausdrücken: 5
Natürlich ist damit nicht gesagt, daß man in der Praxis tatsächlich die Zurückführung immer so weit treiben müsse; vielmehr wird man auch für andere Begriffe, wie und, es gibt, die Klasse, die Zahlen und die Verknüpfung u.s.f. , soweit es für den jeweiligen Zweck erwünscht ist, neue Zeichen einführen.
Mit dieser Erkenntnis ist nun immerhin schon etwas gewonnen. Wir brauchen jetzt nämlichüberhaupt nur noch aus den obigen Zeichen regelrecht gebildete Ausdrücke in Betracht zu ziehen und haben uns damit der Fesseln der Wortsprache bereits entledigt.
Bekanntlich läßt sich die symbolische Logik axiomatisieren, d.h. auf ein System verhältnismäßig weniger Grundformeln und Grundregeln zurück-führen, sodaß auch das Beweisen von Sätzen nunmehr als ein bloßes Rechenverfahren erscheint. Man braucht nur noch zu gegebenen Formeln neue hinzuschreiben, wobei durch Regeln bereits festgelegt ist, was man jeweils hinschreiben darf. Das Beweisen hat sozusagen den Charakter eines Spieles angenommen. Es ist etwa | wie beim Schachspiel, wo man 6 durch Verschieben eines der eigenen Steine, gegebenenfalls mit Wegnahme eines gegnerischen, die jeweils [[gegebene]] vorliegende Stellung in eine neue verwandelt, wobei nur das Verschieben und das Wegnehmen durch die Regeln des Spieles erlaubt sein muß.
Aber gerade dieser Vergleich zeigt uns auch in krasser Weise, daß uns der eben geschilderte Standpunkt der symbolischen Logik für unser Problem noch keineswegs genügen kann. Denn diese sagt uns wie die Regeln des Schachspiels nur, was man tun darf, und nicht, was man tun soll. Dies bleibt in dem einen wie in dem anderen Falle eine Sache des erfinderischen Nachdenkens, der glücklichen Kombination. Wir verlangen aber weit mehr: daß nicht etwa nur die erlaubten Operationen im einzelnen, sondern auch der Gang der Rechnung selbst durch Regeln festgelegt sein soll, m.a.W. eine Ausschaltung des Nachdenkens zugunsten des mechanischen Rechnens. Ist irgend eine logische oder mathematische Aussage vorgelegt, so soll das verlangte Verfahren eine vollständige Anweisung geben, wie man durch eine ganz zwangläufige Rechnung nach endlich vielen Schritten ermitteln kann, ob die gegebene Aussage richtig oder falsch ist. Das eben formulierte Problem möchte ich das allgemeine Entscheidungsproblem nennen.
Für das Wesen des Problems ist von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung, daß als Hilfsmittel des Beweises nur das ganz mechanische Rechnen nach einer gegebenen Vorschrift, ohne irgendwelche Denktätigkeit im engeren Sinne, zugelassen wird. Man könnte hier, wenn man will, von mechanischem oder maschinenmäßigem Denken reden. (Vielleicht kann man es später sogar durch eine Maschine ausführen lassen.) | Es bedarf hier somit nicht bloß der symbolischen Logik als solcher, sondern vielmehr einer besonderen Richtung innerhalb der symbolischen Logik, die nicht nur untersucht, wie man rechnen darf, sondern wie man rechnen [[muß] ] soll , um ein gegebenes Ziel zu erreichen. Diese Richtung möchte ich nun aus einem bestimmten geschichtlichen Grunde als die der Algebra der Logik bezeichnen, und zwar darum, weil alle wichtigen Vorarbeiten auf diesem Gebiet bisher gerade unter diesem Namen der Algebra der Logik (Boole, De Morgan, Peirce, Schröder ) vereinigt sind, [[und zwar] ] vielleicht nur zufällig vereinigt sind, denn, soviel ich wenigstens aus Schröders Werk entnehmen konnte, hat wohl keiner der eben Genannten ernstlich an eine Anwendung auf das Entscheidungsverfahren dabei gedacht. Aber auch sachlich scheint mir dieser Name einigermaßen passend zu sein, weil dieses engere Gebiet eben die Ausbildung von Algorithmen, d.h. zwangläufigen Rechenverfahren, wie in der Algebra etwa für die Auflösung von Gleichungen, zur Aufgabe haben soll. Ich halte es geradezu für einen außerordentlich glücklichen Umstand, daß sich hier eine Gelegenheit darbietet, die bisher namentlich in deräußeren Form ziemlich fragwürdigen und schwer zugänglichen, um nicht zu sagen: langweiligen eintönigen Untersuchungen dieses Gebietes unter einem neuen, einheitlichen und wertvollen Gesichtspunkt zusammenzufassen und damit viel tiefe und beschwerliche Gedankenarbeit vor dem unrühmlichen Ende der langsamen Vermoderung in Bibliotheken zu bewahren. Denn, soweit ich urteilen kann, hatte sich das allgemeine Interesse, selbst bei den Vertretern der symbolischen Logik, von den Untersuchungen jener alten Algebra der Logik in den letzten Jahrzehnten so gut wie vollständig abgewandt. | Zunächst möchte ich einigesüber die von mir verwendete Symbolik sagen. Die Symbolik der alten Algebra der Logik, selbst diejenige von Schröder, ist für den gegenwärtigen Zweck vollständig unbrauchbar. Es empfiehlt sich indessen auch nicht, die Zeichengebung der heutigen symbolischen Logik, etwa diejenige von Whitehead und Russell, | einfach zu 9 ubernehmen, da diese wohl dem weiteren Zweck der symbolischen Logik, aber nicht so sehr dem engeren der Algebra der Logik, wie ich sie verstehe, angepaßt ist. Daher habe ich mich zwar vorwiegend an die Symbolik von Whitehead und Russell angeschlossen, aber diese bis zu einem gewissen Grade nach meinen besonderen Zwecken umgestellt.
Die Negation einer Aussage bezeichne ich, wie gesagt, durchÜberstrei-chen: p, die Disjunktion als p q. Dann stellt sich " p und q" als p q und " Wenn p, so q" als p q dar. Der Bequemlichkeit halber führe ich für " p und q" noch die kürzere Schreibung p.q ein. Daß ein Ding (Individuum) a unter einen Begriff f x fällt, schreibe ich so: f a . Ist die unbestimmte Aussage f x für jedes Ding x richtig, so schreibe ich, um dies anzudeuten: x f x . Daß mindestens ein Ding die Aussage f x erfüllt, läßt sich dann als x f x ausdrücken. Ich schreibe dafürüberdies, dieübereinanderstehenden Teile der beiden Striche gewissermaßen gegeneinander weghebend: x f x .
Klammern benutze ich im wesentlichen nur, um die Verknüpfungen der Disjunktion und der Konjunktion voneinander zu trennen (falls die letzte durch den Punkt bezeichnet wird), sonst nur zur Hervorhebung.
So z.B. x f x g x , x f x p. Das letzte ist an sich zweideutig! Es gilt aber (xf x )p ↔ x(f x p) Regel II * . Entsprechend schreibe ich x.f x .g x x.f x .p, wo der erste Punkt nur Lesezeichen ist.
Unter einen Begriff können nun selbst wieder Begriffe fallen. Ist F φ ein Begriff zweiter Stufe, so schreibe ich F φ für die Aussage, daß der Begriff φ unter den Begriff F fällt. Die Bedeutungen von φF φ und φF φ sind hiernach ohne weiteres klar.
Ich komme nun zur Erklärung der Rechenregeln, die | darüber Aus-10 kunft geben, welche Operationen man mit den hingeschriebenen Zeichen vornehmen darf. Solche Regeln sind auch in der axiomatisch betriebenen symbolischen Logik bekanntlich unentbehrlich. Während man aber dort ihre Zahl und den Gehalt jeder einzelnen auf ein Minimum zu beschränken sucht, verfolgen wir hier das gegenteilige Ziel, nicht: ihre Zahl beliebig zu vermehren -das würde das Gedächtnis unnötig belasten -, wohl aber, jeder einzelnen als auch dem Regelsystem insgesamt eine möglichst große praktische Tragweite zu geben. Im Gegensatz zu[r] axiomatischen Untersuchung sind hier also durchaus praktische Rücksichten maßgebend. 
Bedeutungen:
Beispiel:
xy.f x g y .h x k y ↔ ↔ (xf x )(yg y ).
(xf x h x )(y.g y .k y ).(xh x )(yk y ) durch zwangsläufige Umformung ↔ α β.αγ βδ.γ δ.
Unser Problem lautet nunmehr ρ F ραβ...ab... . Wir haben also links einen Operator ρ und rechts davon einen Ausdruck, nehmen wir an, eine disjunktive Normalform, d.h. eine Disjunktion aus lauter Konjunktionen der obigen Bestandteile. Da wir nach IV * ρ zu jedem einzelnen Disjunktionsglied setzen können, haben wir also nur noch Bestandteile ρ S zu betrachten, wo S eine Konjunktion von Bausteinen ist. Und zwar genügt es hier im besonderen, die Form ρ .αρ .ρβ ↔αβ Dies ist nichts anderes als der bekannte Schluß Barbara.αρ heißt nämlich, daß α eine Teilklasse von ρ ist. Gibt es zu α und β eine " Zwischenklasse" ρ, so ist gewiß auch α eine Teilklasse von β. Aber auch das Umgekehrte gilt. Ist α eine Teilklasse von β, so läßt sich gewiß auch eine Zwischenklasse angeben. Denn es ist ja α ⊂ α ⊂ β und α ⊂ β ⊂ β.
Dies ist das grundlegende Eliminationsergebnis, auf das alle Eliminationen letztlich zurückgeführt werden. Tatsächlich kommt die Klasse ρ bez. der Begriff φ rechts nicht mehr vor.
Von hier aus gelingt es nun durch einen einfachen Gedanken das obige allgemeine Problem Schröders rein rechnerisch zu erledigen, allerdings durch einen Gedanken, den Schröder selbst unmöglich haben konnte, weil er ganz wesentlich auf der Verwendung der modernen verbesserten Symbolik beruht. Es gilt nämlich, (als Sonderfall von III * ) die logische Regel:
x y f xy ↔ y x f xy .
Ebenso, wenn Begriffsoperatoren vorkommen: φ x F φx ↔ x φ F φx .
Nun stecken aber in den γ-und den δ-Gliedern partikuläre Operatoren x, y, und diese kann man vermöge III * ü ber den Klassenoperator ρ nach links hinausschieben, sodaß wir die rechts verbleibenden Individuen x, y nunmehr aus einer Aussage des erweiterten Bereichs B * tatsächlich alle Begriffsoperatoren der Reihe nach eliminieren können. Was nach allen Zurückführungen schließlichübrig bleibt, kann z.B. ein Ausdruck wie ∨ sein, der die gegebene Aussage als unbedingt, d.h. in jedem Individuenbereich gültig erweist -solche werden uns natürlich vor allem interessieren, oder aber etwa ∧ was eine unbedingt falsche Aussage bedeutet. Im allgemeinen Fall wird dagegen ein Ausdruck nach Art des folgenden herausspringen, (den ich absichlich möglichst verzwickt aufgebaut habe):
Dies ist eine disjunktive Normalform.
Bedeutung der Glieder! Die gegebenen Aussage ist im allgemeinen richtig, aber falsch, wenn es genau 1 Individuum oder wenn es genau 4 Individuen gibt.
Bedeutung 
